نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد و مدیریت دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.

2 دانشیار، گروه اقتصاد اسلامی دانشکده اقتصاد و مدیریت دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.

چکیده

فساد مالی یکی از جنبه های ناکارآمدی جوامع است که رشد و توسعه اقتصادی کشورها را تضعیف می‌کند و مورد توجه برنامه‌ریزان و سیاستگذاران قرار دارد. لذا مقاله حاضر ضمن شناسایی 22 متغیر مؤثر بر شاخص فساد مالی، به رتبه‌بندی آن‌ها با استفاده از روش اقتصاد سنجی بیزینی (BMA) در 26 کشور غنی از منابع طبیعی طی سال‌های (2017-1996) می‌پردازد.
نتایج مبنی بر احتمال شمول متغیرها در الگو حاکی از آن است که ثبات سیاسی، دموکراسی، جهانی سازی اقتصادی، حقوق مالکیت، بنیان حقوقی سوسیالیستی و تنوع زبانی وتنوع نژادی از جمله مؤثرترین عوامل بر شاخص فساد مالی هستند. همچنین متغیرهای آزادی سرمایه‌گذاری، وفور منابع طبیعی و درآمد سرانه به ترتیب رتبه دوم تا چهارم را در الگوی فساد مالی به خود اختصاص داده‌اند. متغیرهای آزادی تجارت، مخارج نظامی و اندازه دولت به ترتیب با احتمال 51%، 45% و 21% فساد مالی را در جهت منفی تحت تأثیر قرار داده‌اند. از سوی دیگر رابطه با اهمیتی بین متغیرهای آزادی کسب و کار و آزادی سیاست پولی و شاخص فساد مالی در کشورهای مذکور با توجه به احتمال پایین حضور این متغیرها در الگو مشاهده نمی‌شود. به نظر می رسد که این متغیرها تنها از کانال سایر شاخص‌های آزادی اقتصادی در الگو بر فساد مالی تاثیر‌گذار می‌باشند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Identification and Ranking of Effective Factors on Financial Corruption based on the Bayesian approach (A Case Study of countries rich with natural resources)

نویسندگان [English]

  • elahe Bohloolvand 1
  • hadi Arabi 2

1 PhD student, Faculty of Economics and Management, Qom University, Qom, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics and Management, Qom University, Qom, Iran.

چکیده [English]

Abstract:
Financial Corruption is one of the aspects of inefficiency in societies that undermines the economic growth and development of countries and is considered by planners and policymakers. Therefore, this study identifies 22 effective variables on financial corruption index and ranks them using the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in 26 countries rich with natural resources during 1996-2017.
Inclusion probability indicates that political stability, democracy, economic globalization, property rights, socialist legal origin, ethnic fractionalization and language fractionalization are the most effective factors on financial corruption index.
Also the variables of investment freedom, total natural resources rents and GDP per capita take second to fourth rank regarding their effects on financial corruption model.
the variables of trade freedom, military expenditure and size of government with 51%, 45% and 21% probability of occurrence have affected corruption in a in a negative direction. On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between the variables of business freedom and monetary freedom and the corruption index in these countries, due to the low probability of these variables in the model. It seems these variables can affect corruption only through other channels of economic freedom in the model.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Financial Corruption
  • natural resources
  • Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)
  • Weighted Average Least Squares (WALS)

1. فارسی

باغچقی، اقدس، عبدالله خوشنودی، و جواد هراتی. «بررسی اثر متقابل دموکراسی و امنیت حقوق مالکیت بر فساد مالی در کشورهای منتخب»، پژوهش‌های اقتصادی (رشد و توسعه پایدار) 19، شماره 3 (1398) :109-144.
سپهردوست، حمید، و عادل برجیسیان. «رابطه فساد با حقوق مالکیت، نابرابری درآمد و دموکراسی: شواهد تجربی ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی منتخب»، جستارهای اقتصادی 15، شماره 29 (1397): 172-143.
ﻋﺒﺎس‌زادﮔﺎن، ﺳﻴﺪ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ. ﻓﺴﺎد اداری. تهران: انتشارات دﻓﺘﺮ پژوهش‌های ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕﻲ، 1383.
مرادی، ابراهیم، علی رهنما، و سمیرا حیدریان. «تأثیر شاخص‌های حکمرانی خوب بر کنترل فساد (مطالعه موردی: کشورهای خاورمیانه و جنوب شرق آسیا)»،  فصلنامه اقتصاد مقداری 14، شماره 4 (1396): 182-151.

2. لاتین

Abdiweli M. Ali, & Hoden Said Isse. “Determinants of Economic Corruption, A Cross-Country Comparison”, Cato Journal 22, no. 3 (2003): 449-466.
Ades, Alberto, & Rafael Di Tella. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption"American Economic Association 89, no. 4 (1999): 982-993.
Adsera, Alicia, Carles Boix, & Mark Payne. “Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government”, the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 19, no. 2 (2003): 445–490.
Alesina, Alberto, & George Marios Angeletos. “Fairness and Redistribution: US vs. Europe”, American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 35-913.
Baland, Jean-Marie, & Patrick Francois. “Rent-seeking and resource booms”, Journal of Development Economics 61, no. 2 (2000): 527-542
Billger, Sherrilyn M., & Rajeev K. Goel. “Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption? Cross-country quantile regression estimates”, Journal of Development Economics 90, no. 2 (2009): 299-305.
Bohn, Frank. “A Note on Corruption and Public Investment: The Political Instability”, University of Essex, Department of Economics, no. 28 (2003): 1-16.
Carden, Art, & Lisa Verdon. “When Is Corruption a Substitute for Economic Freedom?”, The Law and Development Review 3, no. 1 (2010): 40-63.
Cerqueti, Roy, Raffaella Coppier, & Gustavo Piga. “Corruption, growth and ethnolinguistic fractionalization: a theoretical game model”, Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (2012): 153-181.
Damania, Richard, Per Fredriksson, & Muthukumara Mani. “The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures”, Theory and Evidence, Public Choice 121, no. 3 (2004): 363-390.
David, Rene, & John E. C. Brierley. Major Legal Systems in the World Today: an introduction to the comparative study of law. London: Stevens & Sons, 1985.
Fredland, J. Eric. “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of Military Companies”, Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals 15, no. 3 (2004): 205-219.
Gatti, Roberta. "Corruption and trade tariffs, or a case for uniform tariffs", Policy Research Working Paper, Series 2216, The World Bank, 1999.
Gnimassoun, Blaise, & Joseph Keneck Massil. "Determinants of corruption: can we put all countries in the same basket? ", European Journal of Comparative Economics 16, no. 2 (2019(: 239-276.
Goel, Rajeev, & Michael Nelson. "Corruption and government size: a disaggregated Analysis", Public Choice 97, no. 1-2 (1998): 20-107.
Goel, Rajeev K., & James W. Saunoris. “Global Corruption and the Shadow Economy: Spatial Aspects”, Public Choice 161, no. 1 (2014): 119-139.
Goel, Rajeev, James Payne, & Rati Ram. “R&D expenditures and U.S. economic growth: A disaggregated approach”, Journal of Policy Modeling 30, no. 2 (2008): 237-250.
Graeff, Pand, & Guido Mehlkop. “The impact of economic freedom on corruption: different patterns for rich and poor countries”, European Journal of Political Economy 19, no. 3 (2003): 605-620.
Gupta, Sanjeev, & Luiz Mello de, & Raju Sharan. "Corruption and military spending", European Journal of Political Economy 17, no. 4 (2001): 749-777.
Heidenheimer, Arnold, Johnston, Michael, & Victor T. LeVine. Political Corruption: A Handbook, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989.
Hudson, John, & Philip Jones. “Corruption And Military Expenditure: At 'No Cost To The King”, Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals 19, No. 6 (2008): 387-403.
Jetter, Michael, & Christopher F Parmeter. "Sorting through global corruption determinants: Institutions and education matter – Not culture", World Development, Elsevier 109 (2018): 279-294.
Kalenborn, Christine, & Christian Lessmann. “The impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption: Conditionality matters”, Journal of Policy Modeling 35, no. 6 (2013): 857-886.
Khan, Mushtaq H. “The efficiency implications of corruption”, Journal of International Development 8, no. 5 (1996): 683-696.
Koop, Gary. Bayesian Econometrics. England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny. “The Quality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, no. 1 (1999): 222– 279.
Le Billon, Philippe. “Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq”, Journal Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4-5 (2008): 685-703.
Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza, & Rodrigo Soares. “Accountability and corruption: political institutions matter, Policy Research Working Paper Series”, The World Bank, no 2708, 2001.
Mauro, Paolo. “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economic 110, no. 3 (1995): 83-107.
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, & Ragnar Torvik. “Institutions and the Resource Curse”, The Economic Journal 116, no. 508 (2006):1–20.
Nye, Joseph S. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Journal of American Political Science Association 61, no. 2 (1967): 417-427.
Pellegrini, Lorenzo, & Reyer Gerlagh. “Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results”, Economics of Governance 9 (2008): 245–263.
Robinson, James A, Ragnar Torvik, & Thierry Verdier. “Political foundations of the resource curse”, Journal of Development Economics 79, no. 2 )2006): 447-468.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. “Democracy and ‘grand’ corruption”, International social science journal 48, no. 149 (1996): 365-380.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Corruption and Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Saha, Shrabani, Rukmani Gounder, & Jen-Je Su. “The interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis”, Economics Letters 105, no. 2 (2009): 173-176.
Tornell, Aaron, & Philip R. Lane. “The Voracity Effect”, American Economic Review 89, no. 1 )1999(:  22-46.
Treisman, Daniel. “The causes of corruption: a cross-national study”, Journal of Public Economics 76, no. 3 (2000): 399-457.

ب - وب‌سایت(ها)

بانک جهانی، www.worlbank.org, WDI
 بنیاد هریتیج، www.heritage.org
مؤسسه Systemic Peace، www.systemicpeace.org
 مؤسسهKOF،  www.kof.ethz.ch
CAPTCHA Image