نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری اقتصاد دانشگاه اصفهان

2 عضو هیئت علمی دانشکده اقتصاد دانشگاه اصفهان

چکیده

بسیاری از اقتصاددانان پاسخ این پرسش را که «چرا برخی کشورها بیشتر توسعه می یابند و برخی دیگر کمتر» در مساله مدیریت منابع در دسترس آنها جست و جو می کنند. بی گمان تصمیم یک ملت به نحوه مدیریت منابع در اختیارش به میزان زیادی شکوفایی اقتصاد و بهزیستی اعضای آن را تعیین می کند. یکی از فرایندهایی که مدیریت منابع و نیز آثار توزیعی آن را در یک کشور تحت تاثیر قرار می دهد، رانت جویی است. در واقع، رانت جویی و هزینه های متعاقب آن می تواند بخشی اساسی از این معما باشد که چرا برخی کشورها توسعه می یابند و برخی دیگر در جا می زنند یا کمتر شکوفا می شوند. بر این اساس و با عنایت به این که رانت جویی یک مساله اساسی اقتصاد ایران نیز می باشد، این مطالعه در نظر دارد تا با تبیین رانت جویی و هزینه های آن، دریافتی دیگر از یکی از علل اساسی کمتر توسعه یافتگی کشورهایی مانند ایران به دست دهد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Rent Seeking and its Social Costs

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohommad khezri 1
  • Mohsen Ranani 2

1 PhD student in Economics, University of Isfahan

2 Faculty member of the Faculty of Economics, University of Isfahan

چکیده [English]

 Looking for an answer to question, why some nations do better in terms of development and others don't" many economists point to management of available resources. No doubt, a nation's decision about how to manage the available resources is main determinant of economic prosperity and well being of the citizens. Rent seeking is (me of the phenomena that influence the resource management and its distributive effects in a country. In fact rent seeking and the ensuing costs could he a substantial part of the puzzle that why some nations develop while the others lag behind or suffer underdevelopment. Given the fact that rent seeking is crucial problem in Iran's economy. this study aims at presenting a new approach to an underlying determinant of underdevelopment in countries like Iran

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Rent
  • rent seeking
  • rent seeking costs
  • Government
  • Corruption

منابع

فارسی

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