نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار دانشکده اقتصاد دانشگاه تهران

2 استادیار پژوهشکده حوزه و دانشگاه

چکیده

چرا کشورهای مختلف رژیمهای مختلفی را برمی گزینند؟ چرا حتی یک کشور معین در زمانهای متفاوت رژیمهای ارزی مختلفی را انتخاب می کند؟ این مقاله بر آن است تا ضمن بررسی اهداف سیاستی، ویژگیهای ساختاری و شوکهای وارد بر اقتصاد به عنوان عوامل موثر بر انتخاب نظام ارزی، پاسخی برای پرسشهای فوق بیابد. با بررسی تحلیلی هر یک از عوامل مذکور استنتاج می شود که اگر چه در ادبیات نسبتا مفصل انتخاب نظام ارزی، ملاکها و معیارهای گوناگونی به عنوان راهنمای انتخاب بیان شده است، اما متاسفانه هیچ توافق کاملی در تعارضات، در اولویت بندی و در کیفیت کمی کردن دقیق معیارهای مختلف وجود ندارد. افزون بر این، نتایج بدست آمده در مطالعات کاملا وابسته به فروض مدلها در مورد اهداف، ویژگیهای ساختاری و شرایط کلان اقتصادی است. بنابراین اگر یک کشور بخواهد عملا ساماندهی ارزی معینی را برگزیند، باید اولا، هدف با اهداف سیاستی را بطور صریح و روشن مشخص نماید؛ ثانیا، ویژگیهای ساختاری و شرایط اقتصادی موجود را شناسایی و تصریح نماید؛ و در مرحله سوم شوکهای وارد بر اقتصاد را شناسایی و اندازه گیری نموده و سرانجام بر اساس اطلاعات فراهم شده، در مورد رژیم ارزی مناسب تصمیم گیری نماید.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Examining the Factors Affecting the Adoption of Currency Regime

نویسندگان [English]

  • Akbar Komijani 1
  • Seyed Hadi Arabi 2

1 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran

2 Assistant Professor of the Research Institute of the Seminary and University

چکیده [English]

Why do different countrisn adopt different currency regimes? Why doer a particminz country adopt different currency regimes in different periods of time? This article attempts to find answers to these questions through studying policy objectives, structural features and shocks received by economy as factors affecting the adoption of a particular currency regime. The study concludes that while various criteria are presented in relatively vast literature concerning the adoption of currency regime unfortunately there is no complete agreement as to the conflicts, prioritizing and precise quantification of the above mentioned criteria Furthermore, the results of the studies are entirely dependent on the hypotheses of the models with regard to the aims, structural characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, when trying to choose a particular currency regime, the country must take the following measures: first, to clearly and specifically identify its policy objective(s); second, to identify existing structural peculiarities andmacroeconomic conditions; thirdly, to identify economic shocks and measure ttICITI: and finally io decide tin the appropriate currency regime on the basis of available data.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Currency regime
  • Adoption of Currency Regime

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